Penalizing fathers who use family-friendly measures. A comparative study with university students from Ghana and Spain.
This article provides experimental empirical evidence on the penalization of a father of high professional status who decides to use a family friendly measure (FFM) offered by his company. A cross-cultural sample of university students (in the field of Business Administration and Economics) from Ghana and Spain was used to evaluate a hypothetical male employee who after the birth of their child either used a reduction of the working day or worked traditional hours. We compared the results with those obtained for an identical female employee. We considered several variables that mediated the effect of using the FFM on the behavior proxy items. We also considered the participants' (explicit and implicit) attitudes towards fathers caring for their babies. We obtained strong empirical evidence on the penalization of a father who uses a reduction of the working day. However, and contrary to expectations, in Spain this penalty experienced by the father was similar to that experienced by the mother, while in Ghana it was greater.